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NOTES
PRIORITY OF RIGHTS TO CUSTOMER'S BANK
ACCOUNT BETWEEN DEPOSITEE BANK
AND ATTACHING CREDITOR
There appears in the Legal Intelligencer Advance Reports of June 23, 19331 the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in the matter of Valiant Company v. Pleasonton, and
Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, garnishee.
The opinion of Judge Stadtfeld filed January 25, 1933
recites the facts in that case, which are briefly summarized
as follows:
The bank held demand notes of Pleasonton, the amounts
of which exceeded a deposit by Pleasonton at the bank.
Valiant Company, having obtained a judgment against
Pleasonton in a sum exceeding the amount of the deposit,
caused an attachment execution to be issued against Pleasonton which was served upon the bank as garnishee. Interrogatories were filed and the bank answered, admitting
the deposit but setting up the demand notes as a set-off.
The Lower Court, Common Pleas No. 5 of Philadelphia, in an opinion by Judge Lamberton, held that since
there was no evidence of a demand having been made for
payment of the notes of Pleasonton held by the bank, they
were unmatured debts due it and as such could not be setoff against Pleasonton's deposit with the bank.
The Appellate Court did not agree with that reasoning and stated that an obligation to pay on demand is absolute and present; that the only element not fixed with certainty by a demand note is the time of paymenb and that
that is at the option of the creditor. The cases of Cook v.
Carpenter,' and Bank of Canton v. Innes,3 were cited.
The opinion of the Superior Court on this point is
logical, convincing and supported by a line of well-reasoned
1108 Pa. Super. Ct. 197; judgment affirmed without opinion by the
Supreme Court. May 22nd, 1933 (311 Pa. 587).
2212 Pa. 165.
866 Pa. Super. Ct. 425.
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decisions. It makes a clear distinction between time and
demand obligations and clearly recognizes the principle that
an unmatured debt cannot be set-off against a matured one.4
Had the Appellate Court's opinion been perorated with the
conclusion above set forth, the ultimate disposition of the
case as affecting the parties litigant, would have been
diametrically opposite but the principle of law thereafter expounded would not have come to light to haunt and confound the student and disrupt the age-old theory of the relationship between bank and depositor.
The Appellate Court predicated its final disposition of
the case upon the theory that an appropiation of the deposit
by the bank, on account of the obligation of the depositor
to it, was necessary in order that the bank might establish
its right to the fund and cited as authorities for the proposition the cases of Schiff v. Schindler,5 Blum Bros. v. Girard
National Bank and Corn Exchange National Bank v.
Locher.T

The decision in each of those cases was against the
bank for insufficient answers but was controlled by the fact
that the obligations of the several depositors to the banks
had not matured on the dates when the rights to set-offs
ceased by reason of receiverships. Receivers were held to
have retained all the rights of the depositors, for whom they
were appointed, which existed on the dates of their respective appointments. It cannot be disputed that a depositor
has the right, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, to withdraw his deposit from a bank which holds his
unmatured obligations. This is in line with the view of the
Superior Court above set forth, but is no authority for the
conclusion that a bank must appropriatea deposit and apply
it on account of a matured obligation of a depositor before
being served with an attachment by one of his other
creditors.
4See Kurtz v. County National Bank, 288 Pa. 472.
598 Pa. Super. Ct. 207.
6248 Pa. 148.
1151 Fed. 764.
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As between depositor and bank the relation of debtor
and creditor exists.8 When a deposit is made in a bank,
the amount thereof is loaned to the bank, it becomes the
money of the bank and the depositor receives therefor a
promise from the bank to pay back the deposit in whole or
in part on demand. In this respect the bank is in no different position than an individual who owes another money
payable on demand. In the latter case the creditor individual can set-off against the sum any matured obligation of
that debtor to him at any time that payment from him is
demanded.9 He is not required to do the useless thing of
changing the money he owes from one pocket to another
before the demand is made. Set-off is his plea when demand is made.10 This applies whether the demand is by the
debtor or someone in his shoes,-his creditor whose attachment is after all only a demand."
But the Superior Court says the attaching creditor in
the present case acquires a lien on the deposit before the
bank appropriates. It does not. It acquires a lien only on
what the depositor had, the promise of the bank to pay
what it owed the depositor less its right of set-off. It could,
as in the case of an individual, be pleaded when demand
was made. The attaching creditor could not obtain a lien
on the bank's money but only the right of the depositor to
the sum the bank owed him over and above his matured
obligations to the bank.
Confusion has resulted from the fact that banks have
numerous depositors and borrowers and consequently a
96 C. J. 1181; People's Bank of Wilkes-Barre v. LeGrand, 103 Pa.
309; Franklin Savings Bank 6 Trust Co. v. Clark, 283 Pa. 212.
oThe right of set-off can be waived by the depositee who will be
subsequently estopped from asserting it against one injured thereby.
Franklin Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Clark, 283 Pa. 212.

'OHimes v. Barritz, 8 Watts 39, justice Sergeant says at Page 43:
"It never was supposed that if one man sues another, the defendant is
obliged to set-off the debt due to him from the plaintiff, and that if he
did not choose to do it, his demand could be considered in any respect

impaired, or his right to recover it affected."
"lLaBarrev. Done., 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 435.
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complicated system of debit and credit accounting whereby
the account of each creditor and debtor is separately
identified. Shorn of its nugatory ramifications the problem
is quite as simple as the theory of set-off itself. "The keepdue because there is an equiting back of something that is
12
it."
withhold
to
reason
able
Philadelphia, Pa.

Ralph B. Umsted.

THE STATUS OF REPRODUCTION COST AS A
METHOD OF VALUATION FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES
The recent decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad
Commission,' has provoked the present inquiry into the history of constitutional rate-making and more particularly
into the status of reproduction cost as a method of valuation for rate-making purposes. A purely analytic discussion of the matter, in view of the many factors involved in
the cases, would require a more exhaustive treatment than
2
may be here attempted. The approach is therefore historical.
The panic of 1893 and resultant low price levels made
reproduction cost as a measure of value very attractive to
consumer representatives. They early urged its advantages upon the courts and commissions,3 and in at least one
lzMichigan Yacht Co. u. Busch, 143 Fed. 929.
'77 L. ed. (Adv. 820) (1933).
'The present discussion is largely indebted both for its general
method and for much of its source material to the scholarly article of E.
C. Goddard, The Evolution of Cost of Reproduction, 41 H. L. R. 564.
(1928).
3San Diego Water Co. v. City of San Diego, 118 Cal. 556, 50 Pac.
633, 636 (1897). Metropolitan Trust Co. of City of New York v.
Houston 6 T. C. R. Co. et al., 90 Fed. 683, 688 (1898).

